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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUMN1£R J. HATCH and ROBERT M.
McRAE,
Plaintiffs

- vs MARY RENZO and TONY RENZO,
Defendants

Case No.
11076

and
.TESSIE GALLO and LENA
GALLO, his wife
Interpleaded Defendants

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THIS COURT
STATEMENT
This case arose from a murder charge against Tony
Renzo, a son of Mary Renzo, and a brother of Lena
Gallo, one of the appellants in this case.
Smuner Hatch, one of the respondents, saw Tony
Renzo in the county jail and was employed to defend
him. He told Tony that he wanted $2,000.00. Tony, nor
his sister Edith Williams, or his sister Jane Korpella,
had any money or property, so they implored and demanded that their sister Lena Gallo, borrow the money
on her home.
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On March ~2, HJG3, Lena Renzo Gallo and her husband, Jesse Gallo took Mary Renzo to tlw realty office
of Fletcher-Lucas Company in Salt Lake City and mortgaged their home to them for $2,092.00. The $92.00 was
for costs in securing the loan. Raymond Fletcher, who
handled the transaction, made out a check for $2,000.00
in favor of Lena and Jess<:> Gallo. Raymond Fletcher
then prepared a note and mortgage for $2,092.00 upon
the home owned by Mary R<>mo, the subject of this suit,
and had Mary Renzo sign the papers with her mark, as
she could neither read or write English. Raymond
Fletcher was the witness to this signature. This mortgage was recorded the same day. Lena and ,Jesse Gallo
endorsed the check for $2,000.00 and handed it to Mary
R.enzo, who in turn, gave it to the office of Smnner
Hatch.
On April 5, 1965, two weeks later, Hatch or McRae
met Mary Renzo and her daughter, Edith Williams, and
secured a mortgage on the home of Mary Renzo for the
additional sum of $5,500.00 They also secured Tony
Renzo's name on the note and mortgage, though he had
no interest therein.
Mary Renzo also signed with a cross which was
witnessed by her daughter, Edith Wllliams. The instrument was recorded the same day, April 5, 1965.
On August 4, 196G, the respondents, 8nmner Hatch
and Robert McRae, as plaintiffs, brought a suit against
Mary and Tony Renzo to foreclose the April 5, 1965,

mortgage, without naming any others who may have a
rlaim against tht~ property, such as the prior mortgage of
Lena and Jesse Gallo.
Lena Gallo called this attorney when her mother,
who was then liYing with the Gallos, was served. I was
as unfamiliar with mortgage procedure as Hatch and
McRa<e~, and I inadvertently filed an answer for Mary
Renzo and interpleaded Lena and Jesse Gallo as defendants to avoid a default. I then withdrew as Mary
Renzo's attorney and commenced a suit to foreclose the
prior mortgage executed by Mary Renzo, to the Gallos,
without naming Hatch and McRae as defendants. I
amended the complaint naming Hatch and McRae as
defendants on November 17, 1966, and they accepted
service. When they did not answer, I gave them notice
on Febrnary 13, 1967, that if they did not answer to
my amended complaint (page 5) that I would take a
default.
It was then that a motion was filed by Hatch and
-McRae on E'ebrnary 17, 1967 to dismiss my amended
complaint against them and Mary Renzo.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. CASE No. 166824.
Und<~r Utah Law, Section 57-3-2 the plaintiffs in case

No. 1GG288 were charged with notice of the prior recording of tlw Uallo mortgage on the same property plain3

tiffs and respondents had sued to foreclose, without
having named these interpleaded defendants and appellants, as defendants under Utah 8ode Annotated 1953:
"57-3-2 Record imparts notice: l£very conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real
estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title,
required by law to be recorded in the office of the
county recorder shall, from the time of filing the
same with the recorder for record, impart notice
to all persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees or lien holders shall
be deemed to purchase and take with notice."
The order of priority hetwe0n persons claiming liens
on the same property by mortgage depends on the respective dates when they were recorded. 59 C.J.S. No.
242 - Page 313. Under Annotation 10 and all of the
states cited thereunder.
The court was aware, or was made aware of plaintiffs priority in case No. 166824, yet it dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint in said case with prejudice.
Our position is the court should have joined case No.
166824 with case No. 166288, and dismissed the interpleaded defendants answer, which would have properly
preserved the equities and rights of the parties.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF MAY 31,
1967.

ThP respondents hase their entire case, and the
(·onrt follmn•d them, nnder Rule 37 - Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is refusal to answer. The record
will show that respondents served counsel for the appellants Notice of taking deposition (page 35) of Lena Gallo
for 9 :00 A.M. and Jesse Gallo for 9 :30 A.M. and Mary
Henzo for 10 :00 A.M. and Tony Renzo for 10 :30 A.M.
and Jane Korpella for 11 :00 A.M., to be taken in the
office of respondents.
Mary Renzo, who executed the mortgage, the subject
of this appeal, is the mother of Lena Gallo, the wife of
Jesse Gallo, and also the mother of Tony Renzo and Jane
or Jenny. Tony Renzo and the appellants, Lena Gallo
and Jesse;. Gallo, learning of the foreclosure suit commenced by Hatch and McRae, had a violent quarrel
which also involved the mother and sister Jenny.
The day designated for taking of the depositions
Lena Galo and Jesse Gallo went to the respondents
office, arriving about 8 :50 o'clock A.M., and Mary Renzo
and Tony Renzo were already there. Counsel objected
to having the depositions taken in the presence of Mary
and Tony Renzo, due to the family feud, and counsel
mad<' a statement into the record of the reporter, said
statement is on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court,
and is inrlndl'd in the designation on appeal. It clearly
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shows that the appellants were willing to have their depositions taken now or anytime, bnt to avoid further hostility it would be to the good of all concerned to submit
to the depositions without the presence of Mary or Tony
Renzo.
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
here: The record made at the time will clearly show
that there wasn't any refusal to have the depositions
taken, the statement will show that the only objection
was the presence of the mother and brother, who, with
Jenny Korpella, were allied ag·ainst these appellants.
The order of May 31, 1967 in paragraph 1 (quote) :
"Since the interpleaded defendants Gallo did not
seek a protective order prior to the scheduled
time for the taking of their depositions,"
and further in paragraph 2 (quote) :
"Since the said Galos refused without legal cause
to submit to the taking of their depositions, plaintiffs are entitled to an award of this court."
And then follows a series of charges amounting to
$228.40, and it follows in paragraph 3 of said order,

"It is further ordered as a condition precedent
to the interpleaded Gallos appearance at the office of plaintiffs to have their depositions taken,
that the aforesaid snrns totaling $228.40 be paid
within 24 hours of the time scheduled for their
appearance."
6

And paragraph 4 provides that in the event the money
iw't paid the court will dismiss the answer of the interpleaded defendants (which the court treats as a complaint
in intervention) will fie 8tl9mililua with prejudice.
There isn't any question that the Gallo mortgage
is prior to the plaintiffs as a matter of law, and upon a
trial on its merits, which appellants are entitled to; and
appellants prevail in their priorities over the respondents, and at the trial if it is shown that respondents
an' entitled to any part of the $228.40, the same could
be credited on the account due the holder of the first
mortgage. There is nothing in the rules of Utah Civil
procedure that permits the court to say as a condition
precedent, either you pay the amount stated or your
mortgage will be vacated and cast aside, yet that is
exactly what the court has done here. The court has in
effect laid the groundwork to supplant a first mortgage
at law by a second, and inferior mortgage. All of the
rules of equity have, herein, been violated.
As to the order stating the appellants did not seek
a protective order from the court prior to the date of
taking the depositions, is without merit, for the following
reason: That the time for taking of the appellants'
deposition was 9 :00 o'clock A.M. and 9 :30 o'clock A.M.,
followed by the other three.
Under what circumstances could the appellants foresee the presence of the rest of the Renzo family at 9 :00
o'clock A.M. and 9 :30 o'clock A.M.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO VACATE AND THE COURT ERRED IN
SIGNING ITS ORDER OF AUGUST 16, 1967.

The court in its order of Angnst 16, 1967 (page 65)
treated appellants motion to vacate and set aside, as a
motion to reconsider, and the court finding such a motion
is an improper motion and the remedy of the interpleaded
Gallos should have heen an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Such an order is not an appealable order, as it is
not the final order or a judgment thereon.
This court held in Dntry vs. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2nd
74 - Page 75:

"It is signnficant that our rules of Civil Proced-

ure do not provide for a motion to reconsider its
ruling, granting or denying a motion for a new
trial. Undoubtedly this is advisedly so. The objective of all rules of procedure is that the parties
have a full and fair opportunity for a trial and
determination of the issues between them," etc.
How then can the Judge below treat a motion to vacate
and set aside as a motion to reconsider and deny the
same on those grounds?

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE.

The motion to strik<-· (P. 37) states in paragraph 1
that the court is wholy without authority to attach such

8

a condtn precedent to any order wherein a first mortgage by law can be vacated and cast aside and substitute
a second mortgage of record in its place. There is no
precedent in the law of mortgages or the rules of Utah
procedme, to justify such action by a court.
1'o 11phold the court below would trample the law
of eqnit~' and such a rule should not be permitted by any
doctrine of jurisprudence.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF OCTOBER
6, 1967.

The court will note that the taking of the depositions
of Lena and Jesse Gallo was noticed for October 11, 1967,
and the court having previously permitted the mother of
Lena Gallo and her brother and sister to be present.
However, plaintiffs and respondents had learned that
Mary Renzo was, at the time, living with her daughter,
Edith Williams, in Redwood City, California, so on September 28, 1967, plaintiffs and respondents filed their
motion (P. GO) and notice of hearing thereof (P. 62) for
October 13, 1967, requesting the court to compel interpleaded defendants and appellants to pay the costs and
expenses of Mary Renzo from Redwood City, California,
to Salt Lake City, and return. The court will also note
that the deposition of Mary Renzo had previously been
taken, and respondents' motion asked for expense money
in order to have the mother present when her daughter,
Lena Gallo, and her son-in-law's depositions were taken.
9

There is no precedt:•nt for such an order. It is nonsense and frivolons in the l'xtreme to the judicial minds
of men - yet the conrt grantl•d th<- motion and signed
its order, (P. 71) and aPlwllanb specificall)' call the
attention of the court to page 73 of the courts order
commencing at paragraph om·, wherein the court :cwts
out that said plaintiffs may sPne oral notice on counsel
that the depositions will tlwn•aftc>r be continued until
November 30, 1967, at~) :00 o'clock A.M., and that on or
before 5 :00 P ..M., Novemlwr 10, 1967, the intPI'pleaded
defendants are ordered to deposit with the clerk of the
above court, round trip travel <'xpPnsc•s for Mary Renzo
to Salt Lake City, Utah, and back to Redwood City,
California. Failure to deposit the m01wy by Novemb~r
10, 1967, and upon certification of the clerk that the
money was not deposited, all elaims set forth by appellants in this action will be strickPn and dismissed with
prejudice and give respondents judgment by default in
accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint.
Appellants might add that the same rwnalty has been
repeated by the court in every directive and order it has
made in this case.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE FINDINGS SUBMITTED.

On October 11, 19()7, 11fN Htt hcbnmty Ml Robert
McRae, one of the plaintiffa and respondl'nts in the case,
gave testimony beforP the Honorable 8tt>wart M. Hanson,
of the District Court of Salt Lake County.
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The court will note that all of the motions and orders
'
upon which the judgment was predicated, were made
and issued by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins, of the same
Court .
On October 11, 19()7, the same witness made his affidavit, a copy of ·which was mailed to opposing counsel
thr same day (P. 75). Appellants call the courts attention to varngraph 3 of the affidavit which says:
"Said attorneys fees and expenses should have
been paid within 24 hours of the last notice of the
taking of interpleaded defendants depositions on
October 11, 1967, at the hour of 9 :00 A.M."
The affidavit carefully avoids the motion and notice
(P. 60) which asked for an order compelling the interpleaded defendants to pay the expenses of bringing Mary
Renzo from California and return, so that she could be
present to hear the taking of the depositions of her
daughter and son-in-law.
This motion was noticed for hearing for October 13,
1967. ( P. 62). The fact is the motion was heard on
October 6, 1967, for the reason the appellants Gallo had
filed a motion to strike, and the same had been noticed
for October 6, 1967, and it was orally agreed between
counsel that the motion of plaintiffs and respondents,
noticed for the 13th, could also be heard October 6, 1967,
and the court, on October 6, 1967, signed its order granting- the expenses of Mary Renzo in coming from Califomi a and return, for the slight and frivolous reason that
:-;}u~ lH' present, merely as an onlooker, to the taking of
the depositions.
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The October 11, 19G7, deposition date is in conflict
with the courts order of October G, 1967, for the reasons
following:

1. Plaintiffs and respondents wPrl' adamant in their
demands that Mary Renzo and Ton>~ Renzo be present
when said depositions are taken.
2. The court in its final order (P. 73) in the first
paragraph, extends the final tinH' to get Mary Renzo
here, to November 30th at 9 :00 A.M. and that on or
before 5 :00 P.M. November 10, 1967, the interpleaded
defendants are ordered to deposit with the clerk of the
above court, round trip expenses for Mary Renzo from
California to Salt Lake City, Utah, and then upon certification of the court clerk that thP monies have not been
paid, the court will strike all claims of the interpleaded
defendants and dismiss their canse of action with prejudice, etc. Where in the record is the certification of the
clerk.
3. Would the court have signed a judgment on October 11, 1967, if it had carefully reviewed the record and
had read the final order of the conrt of October 6, 1967.
Would the court have signed a judgment on October 11,
1967, if it had read plaintiffs and respondents motion
of September 2G, 1967, and the notice calling it up for
hearing on October 13, 1967. This shows an abandonment
of the October 11 date.
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
were fikd October 11, 1967, stress was placed on fraud
committed on Mary Renzo by th(~ appellants. Where in
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this record is such an inference 1 The note and mortgage
of the appellants plainly show that the execution of the
note was witnessed by Raymond Fletcher, of the FletcherLucas Realty Company, an old and reliable firm, and
the court below is entitled to hear any evidence of fraud,
and it in tnrn is entitled to hear the facts relating to
the execution of the mortgage executed by Mary Renzo,
after all she did receive a check from the Fletcher-Lucas
Company for $2,000.00.
Fraud must be proved clearly and convincingly, and
can only be done before a court of law by direct testimony, and the court must be fully convinced that fraud
existed at the time of execution of the mortgage before it
ean properly vacate and strike it from the record, and
dismiss with prejudice all claims of the holder thereof.
There is no sworn testimony before the court on
which to predicate fraud.
This case should be reversed and remanded back
to the court below with instructions as to the rights
of the parties, and proper costs should be assessed against
the plaintiffs and respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
W.R. Huntsman,
Attorney for Interpleaded
Defendants and Appellants
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